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For a long time interest in the sense of agency was confined to a small group of researchers such
as philosophers of mind concerned with fundamental questions of consciousness and free will or
neuropsychologists investigating mental illnesses that clearly involve abnormalities of agency (e.g.,
psychosis). This niche existence obscured the concept’s relevance for many societal and cultural
phenomena in which individuals experience subjective control over objectively uncontrollable
events, or neglect control over events they have caused. It also resulted in a rather small number of
scientific studies addressing the sense of agency. Today, scientific investigations of sense of agency
constitute a rapidly expanding field. This is evident in the rising number of scientific articles related
to the topic as listed on search engine databases such as PubMed.
Significant progress has been made with respect to some fundamental questions concerning the
sense of agency, for example, in shedding light on the brain regions supporting sense of agency
or in clarifying its conceptual boundaries. Yet, numerous questions remain unanswered. These
include, but are not limited to, what neural network dynamics underlie the sense of agency, how
does the sense of agency develop across the lifespan (e.g., in children compared to adults), and how
can agency research be used in more applied domains, like engineering and computer science. The
contributions in this research topic go some way to answering these questions. Here we provide a
brief overview of these contributions, focusing on general themes that have emerged.
A number of contributions add to the theoretical literature on sense of agency. Some consider
the applicability of Bayesian approaches to sense of agency (Friston et al., 2013; Moutoussis
et al., 2014), an exciting development that promises to integrate agency research within a wider
theoretical framework for understanding neurocognitive function. Other theoretical contributions
have highlighted, and attempted to overcome, problems with existing models of agency processing
(Carruthers, 2014; Chambon et al., 2014; Cioffi et al., 2014; Gentsch and Synofzik, 2014; Sowden
and Shah, 2014; Swiney and Sousa, 2014). These cover a range of issues such as the affective
dimension of agency processing (Gentsch and Synofzik, 2014) and the contribution of prospective
(pre-motor) cues to sense of agency (Chambon et al., 2014). Collectively, these contributions
demonstrate the relative maturity of theoretical work on sense of agency and how significant
progress is being made in our understanding of it. Finally, other theoretical contributions have
looked at more applied aspects of agency research, for example, the relevance of agency theory and
methods for the field of human-computer-interaction, an exciting new arena in which to explore
sense of agency (Limerick et al., 2014).
Amongst the original research articles, a large group of contributions used the so-called
Libet-clock to investigate sense of agency, with the majority focusing on the intentional binding
effect (Barlas and Obhi, 2013; Cavazzana et al., 2014; Jo et al., 2014; Penton et al., 2014;
Pfister et al., 2014; Hascalovitz and Obhi, 2015). Those contributions using intentional binding
have done so in new and exciting ways, for example to assess agency processing in children
(Cavazzana et al., 2014) and in social contexts (Pfister et al., 2014). However, intentional
binding was not the only method used in our empirical contributions and important insights
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have been gleaned from a number of different methods such
as the joint Simon effect and classical psychophysical measures
together with Bayesian modeling (Kawabe, 2013; Stenzel et al.,
2014). A particularly novel contribution used sensory attenuation
to examine agency processing during lucid dreaming, pushing
agency research into exciting new areas (Windt et al., 2014).
Additionally, a few contributions further examined the neural
underpinnings of the sense of agency in methodologically novel
and exciting ways. These have investigated the neural correlates
of sense of agency as well as the neural networks supporting
this experience (Dogge et al., 2014; Jo et al., 2014; Ritterband-
Rosenbaum et al., 2014a,b). These contributions represent a
significant advance in neuroimaging approaches to agency
processing.
The final theme we have identified in the contributions centers
around disorders of agency. These have extended the classical
example of psychosis by discussing loss of agency in apraxia,
anosognosia for hemiplegia and phantom-limb phenomena
(Imaizumi et al., 2014; Pazzaglia and Galli, 2014; Preston and
Newport, 2014). There is also an important discussion of
the utility of objective measures of sense of agency, such as
intentional binding, in helping to improve our understanding
of neurological disorders (Wolpe and Rowe, 2014). From these
contributions it is becoming increasingly clear that aberrant
experiences of agency are an important feature of numerous
psychiatric and neurological disorders.
Taken together, this Research Topic demonstrates the
impressive breadth of research currently being undertaken
on sense of agency. The contributions themselves reveal the
various applications, cross-disciplinary relevance and widespread
significance of this topic. Sense of agency is now firmly on
the agenda of psychologists, philosophers, computer scientists,
neuroscientists, and neurologists/psychiatrists. However, despite
the fact that significant progress has been made in our
understanding of sense of agency and its real-world relevance,
there is much work still to be done. Indeed this research topic
serves as a record not only of where agency research is at present,
but also as an indicator of where it can go in the future.
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